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Relaxed Connected Dominating Set Problem
with Application to Secure Power Network Design
Kin Cheong Sou and Jie Lu
Abstract—This paper investigates a combinatorial optimiza-
tion problem motived from a secure power network design
application in [Da´n and Sandberg 2010]. Two equivalent graph
optimization formulations are derived. One of the formulations
is a relaxed version of the connected dominating set problem,
motivating the term relaxed connected dominating set (RCDS)
problem. The RCDS problem is shown to be NP-hard, even for
planar graphs. A mixed integer linear programming formula-
tion is presented. In addition, for planar graphs a fixed param-
eter polynomial time solution methodology based on sphere-
cut decomposition and dynamic programming is presented.
The computation cost of the sphere-cut decomposition based
approach grows linearly with problem instance size, provided
that the branchwidth of the underlying graph is fixed and small.
A case study with IEEE benchmark power networks verifies
that small branchwidth are not uncommon in practice. The case
study also indicates that the proposed methods show promise
in computation efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our society depends heavily on the proper operation
of network systems including intelligent transport systems,
electric power distribution and transmission systems etc.
These systems are supervised and controlled through Super-
visory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. For
instance, in the electric power transmission grid, SCADA
systems collect measurements through remote terminal units
(RTUs) and send them to the state estimator to estimate
the system states. The estimated states are used for subse-
quent operations such as contingency analysis (for system
health monitoring) and optimal power flow dispatch (for
control). Any malfunctioning of these operations can lead
to significant social and economical consequences such as
the northeast US blackout of 2003.
Because of its importance, the SCADA measurement
system has been the subject of extensive studies. Recently, an
important measurement system related research topic which
has attracted a lot of attention is cyber-physical security. One
of the purposes of cyber-physical security studies is to ana-
lyze various types of data attacks and their consequences on
the system (e.g., [1]–[7]). Another important research direc-
tion, which is the focus of this paper, is security-guaranteeing
system design. A typical design objective is to seek the
minimum cost strategic placement of protection resources
(e.g., encryption devices, secure phasor measurement units)
so that, according to the chosen attack and defense model,
no data attack in the system is possible (e.g., [2], [4], [7]).
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The security-guaranteeing system design problem is also
closely related to the problem of observability-guaranteeing
system design in power systems (e.g., [8], [9]). Because of
the combinatorial feature, it is often considered “acceptable”
to obtain only suboptimal solutions of protection placement
problems. For example, [2], [4], [7] consider various types
of heuristic algorithms for protection placement, aiming
to minimize the protection cost. Reference [6] provides a
suboptimal (in economic sense) strategy for some given
possible attack scenarios. Instead, this paper reports efficient
and exact solution methodologies, with optimality guarantee,
to a nontrivial system protection placement problem first
described in [2]. The design problem, to be described in
Section II, seeks a minimum cost strategy to encrypt the
measurement communications in a power network, in order
to prevent stealth data attack of the form in [1]. Reference [2]
points out that the design problem is related to a dominating
set problem, and proposes a heuristic suboptimal solution
algorithm based on the observation. While the analysis in
[2] is performed in a linear algebra setting involving matrix
rank calculations, this paper investigates the problem from
a graph perspective and provides two equivalent graph opti-
mization formulations characterizing the problem. We prove
that the design problem is NP-hard (even when restricted
to planar graphs). In addition, we derive a mixed integer
linear programming formulation of the problem that is easy
to implement (with three sets of constraints) and reasonably
efficient to solve (e.g., CPLEX solves an instance with 300
nodes in less than one second on a personal computer). To
enable the design with very large-scale systems we develop a
fixed parameter polynomial time design algorithm, which is a
two-step procedure based on sphere-cut decomposition [10]
and dynamic programming. This approach provides an exact
solution to the design problem when the underlying graph
is planar, and provides a (reasonably tight) upper bound
in general. The main advantage of the proposed approach
is computation efficiency in both theory and practice. The
computation cost grows linearly with problem instance size
(i.e., number of edges), provided that a graph structure
parameter called branchwidth [10] is fixed and small. In
practice, it is not uncommon (as indicated by the IEEE power
network benchmarks) that the branchwidth of an application
graph is small, because intuitively branchwidth is a measure
of how closely a graph resembles a tree (branchwidth ≤
2 for trees). The sphere-cut decomposition (resp., branch
decomposition and tree decomposition) approach has been
applied with success to provide fixed parameter polynomial
time algorithms for difficult combinatorial problems (e.g.,
[11], [12]). In fact, [13], a precursor to this paper, applies
the branch decomposition technique to solve the standard
dominating set problem related to the design problem in
this paper. The main difference between the current paper
and [13] is that the exact model for the design problem is
considered here. In addition, the complexity analysis, the
integer programming formulation and the tailored sphere-
cut decomposition based optimization algorithm are reported
for the first time. The current paper is also similar to two
previous work in algorithmic computer science/combinatorial
optimization, namely [14], [15]. In particular, reference [14],
which is more related to this paper, describes a sphere-
cut decomposition/dynamic programming algorithm for the
connected dominating set problem. Part of the distinction
of this paper is that we consider a relaxed (and more
general) version of the connected dominating set problem.
As a result, the dynamic programming algorithm needs to
be generalized. Moreover, reference [14] focuses purely on
the theoretical optimization problem, while we formulate the
relaxed connected dominating set problem from application.
Outline: In Section II the secure system design problem is
described. In Section III two equivalent graph optimization
formulations modeling the secure system design problem
are presented. The complexity of the problem is discussed,
and a mixed integer linear programming formulation is
presented. Section IV introduces the two-step fixed parameter
polynomial time algorithm for the design problem when
the underlying graph is planar. It reviews the first step –
sphere-cut decomposition. Section V explains the second
step – dynamic programming to solve the design problem.
The parameterized complexity is briefly discussed in the end
of the section. Section VI presents a numerical case study
on IEEE power network benchmarks. It demonstrates the
practical usefulness of the presented solution approaches.
II. APPLICATION MOTIVATIONS
A power network can be modeled as an undirected con-
nected graph where the nodes are buses, and the edges
are transmission lines. Following [2], this paper adopts the
DC power flow model [16] as the measurement model for
state estimation. In this model, the power system states are
the voltage phasors at the buses and the vector of states
is denoted by θ . In this paper, the “full measurement”
assumption is made. That is, as in the setup of [2], each bus
is equipped with a remote terminal unit (RTU) to obtain the
following measurements: (net) active power injection at the
bus and active power flows on the transmission lines incident
to the bus. Let z denote the vector of measurements. Then,
the states and measurements are related by z = Hθ + ∆z,
where H is the measurement matrix describing how the
active power injection and active power flow measurements
are linearly related to the voltage phasors (i.e., the states).
∆z models the imperfection of the measurements. In this
paper, ∆z is assumed to be the vector of data attacks in the
measurements.
In power system operations, a “bad data detection” (BDD)
scheme attempts to detect possible data attack in the mea-
surements (i.e., ∆z). In a typical residual-based BDD scheme,
the measurement residual r and the data attack ∆z are related
by r = (I−H(HT R−1H)−1HT R−1)∆z := S∆z, where R is a
given diagonal positive definite matrix and S is typically
referred to as the residual sensitivity matrix. In the BDD
scheme, if the residual r is large (in magnitude, for example)
the data attack ∆z is also large. In this case, the operator is
notified of possible anomalies in the power system. However,
it can be verified that SH = 0. This fact was exploited
in [1] to introduce a detection-evading data attack of the
form ∆z = Hθ˜ , where θ˜ can be interpreted as a vector of
“fictitious” voltage phasors, because the residual resulted
by ∆z = Hθ˜ is zero. In view of the interpretation of the
measurement matrix H and the full measurement assumption,
a data attack ∆z can evade BDD detection if the following
“attack rules” are satisfied:
(A1) every bus can be associated with some fictitious voltage
phasor (collectively forming the vector θ˜ in above) such
that the component of ∆z affecting active power flow
measurement on a transmission line is proportional to
the difference of the fictitious voltage phasors at the
incident buses.
(A2) at each bus the component of ∆z affecting active power
injection measurement satisfies Kirchhoff’s current law
with the components of ∆z affecting the active power
flow measurements on incident transmission lines.
To counter these attacks, [2] considers the scenario in which
buses can be protected by installing authentication devices in
the corresponding RTUs. The protection rules are as follows:
(P1) if a bus is protected, then none of the measurements
related to the bus can be attacked. In other words,
the components of data attack ∆z corresponding to the
measurements related to the bus must be zero. The
related measurements include the active power injection
at the bus and the active power flows on all incident
transmission lines.
(P2) if a bus is not protected, then the active power injection
measurement at the bus can be attacked.
(P3) if a transmission line is not incident to any protected
bus, then the active power flow measurement on it can
be attacked.
Note that without the “full measurement” assumption, pro-
tection rules different from (P1)-(P3) need to be considered.
The discussion of the ramifications is, however, beyond the
scope of this paper. A subset of buses is called a perfect
protection set if when the buses in the set are protected,
according to the protection rules (P1) through (P3), there
cannot be any detection-avoiding data attack with fictitious
voltage phasors satisfying attack rules (A1) and (A2). In [2],
the perfect protection problem seeks a minimum cardinality
perfect protection set. Assuming that the cost associated with
the protection is nondecreasing with the number of protected
buses, a minimum perfect protection set provides the most
economical protection placement strategy. See Fig. 1 for two
examples of perfect protection sets of a six-node network.
!"
#"
$"
%"
&"
'"
!"
#"
$"
%"
&"
'"
Fig. 1: In both figures, the shaded buses are protected and
they form perfect protection sets. Left: every transmission
line is incident to at least one protected bus. By (P1), the
data attack component on every transmission line must be
zero. By (A2), the Kirchhoff’s current law implies that all
injection components of ∆z must be zero as well. Right: not
all components of ∆z are immediately set to zero by (P1).
However, the components of ∆z are zero on {1,2}, {2,3},
{2,4},{4,6},{5,6}, forming a spanning tree. By (A1), the
fictitious phasors on all buses are the same (in fact zero due
to grounding). Hence, nonzero detection-evading data attack
is impossible.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATIONS AND COMPLEXITY
Let (V,E) be a simple undirected graph modeling a power
network, with V being the node set and E ⊆ {{u,v} | u ∈
V,v ∈ V} being the edge set. In this paper, we use the
unordered pair {u,v} to denote an (undirected) edge. For
any graph G, we use the symbols V (G) and E(G) to denote
the sets of nodes and edges, respectively.
A set D ⊆ V is called a (graph) perfect protection set
if the bus set corresponding to D is a perfect protection
set for the power network modeled by (V,E). Accordingly,
the (graph) perfect protection problem seeks a minimum
cardinality (graph) perfect protection set. For a given graph
modeling a power network, it is possible to characterize the
perfect protection sets directly in graph, without using the
original definition of perfect protection sets involving attack
rules (A1) and (A2) and protection rules (P1) through (P3). In
the following, two equivalent definitions of perfect protection
set are presented. The two definitions lead to two equivalent
formulations of the perfect protection problem with different
advantages.
A. Integer programming problem formulation
The first characterization of perfect protection set is as
follows:
Proposition 1: Let connected graph (V,E) be given. For
any U ⊆V , let IU(E) := {{i, j} ∈ E | {i, j}∩U 6= /0} denote
the subset of E incident to U . Then, a set D ⊆ V is a
perfect protection set if and only if the subgraph (V, ID(E))
is connected.
Proof: Let V be the set of buses and E be the set
of transmission lines for the power network associated with
the graph (V,E). If {u,v} ∈ ID(E), then either bus u, v
or both is protected. According to protection rule (P1) and
transmission line constitutive relation (i.e., attack rule (A1)),
the fictitious voltage phasors at u and v are the same.
Therefore, if (V, ID(E)) is connected the fictitious voltage
phasors at all buses are the same. In this case, non-zero
data attack is impossible. Conversely, suppose (V, ID(E)) is
not connected. Let (V0,E0) be a connected component of
(V, ID(E)). Let E˜ = {{u,v} ∈ E | u ∈ V0,v ∈ V \V0}. That
is, E˜ connects (V0,E0) with the rest of the (V,E) if the
edges in E˜ were not removed. Note that E˜ 6= /0 since (V,E)
is assumed to be connected. In addition, E˜ ∩ ID(E) = /0,
since otherwise (V0,E0) would not be a (maximal) connected
component in (V, ID(E)). Hence, if {u,v}∈ E˜ then u /∈D and
v /∈D, meaning that neither bus u nor bus v is protected. By
protection rules (P2) and (P3), the injection measurements
at u and v, as well as the power flow measurement on
transmission line {u,v} can be modified by the attack. As a
result, a detection avoiding data attack can be constructed as
follows: set the fictitious voltage phasors at all buses in V0
to be one and the fictitious voltage phasors at all other buses
to be zero. Then, for every {u,v} ∈ E˜ assuming without loss
of generality that u ∈ V0 and v /∈ V0, the active power flow
attack on transmission line {u,v} equals the proportional
constant in attack rule (A1), denoted as Huv. In addition,
there is Huv units of active power injection modification into
u and Huv unit of active power extraction modification from
v. At all edges not in E˜ , the active power flow attacks are
zero because the fictitious voltage phase angle difference is
nonzero if and only if the transmission line is in E˜ . Also,
attack rule (A2) can be satisfied by setting the active power
injection modifications to zero for all buses not incident to
E˜ . As a result, the desired detection avoiding data attack is
constructed when (V, ID(E)) is not connected.
See Fig. 1 for two examples of perfect protection sets
(shaded). In the left, ID(E) = E and the subgraph (V, ID(E))
is the original graph which is connected. In the right, ID(E)=
{{1,2},{1,3},{2,3},{2,4},{4,6},{5,6}}. It can be verified
that (V, ID(E)) is connected.
Remark 1: The connected components of (V, ID(E)) in
the statement of Proposition 1 correspond to observable
islands in the terminology of power network state estimation
observability analysis [16]. 
A benefit of the perfect protection set characterization
in Proposition 1 is that it enables the mixed integer linear
programming formulation of the perfect protection problem.
For each i∈V , we denote the neighborhoodNi := { j | {i, j} ∈
E}. In addition, we designate (arbitrarily) a source node
s ∈ V . Then, the perfect protection problem is formulated
as:
minimize
x,y
|V |
∑
i=1
xi
subject to ∑
j∈Ni
yi j − ∑
j∈Ni
y ji =−1, ∀i ∈V \ {s}
yi j + y ji ≤ (|V |− 1)(xi+ x j), ∀{i, j} ∈ E
xi ∈ {0,1}, ∀i, yi j ≥ 0, y ji ≥ 0, ∀{i, j} ∈ E
(1)
The decision variables are defined such that i ∈ V is in the
perfect protection set D if and only if xi = 1. The decision
variables yi j and y ji for each {i, j}∈E are auxiliary “network
flow” variables along the edges in two possible directions,
in order to model connectedness of the subgraph (V, ID(E))
in Proposition 1. The first constraint is flow conservation
constraint at all nodes except the source s. This means that
for every i ∈V \{s} one unit of flow is being shipped from
s to i. The second constraint, together with the nonnegativity
of the flows in the third constraint, specifies that an edge
{i, j} can be used to ship flows if and only if at least one of
its two ends is chosen in the perfect protection set D. As a
result, the three constraints together model the requirement
that (V, ID(E)) is connected.
B. Relaxed connected dominating set problem formulation
The second (equivalent) characterization of perfect protec-
tion set is as follows:
Proposition 2: Let graph (V,E) be given. A set D⊆V is
a perfect protection set if and only if D satisfies both of the
following conditions
1) D is a dominating set of (V,E), meaning that every node
in V is either in D or a neighbor of a member of D;
2) For any i, j ∈ D, there exists a sequence i =
i0, i1, . . . , ip = j with {ik, ik+1}∈E for 0≤ k≤ (p−1). In
addition, for all s, t with 0≤ s < t ≤ p such that is, it ∈D
but ik /∈D for all s < k < t, it holds that s = t− 2.
Proof: We denote by C1 the condition that the subgraph
(V, ID(E)), as defined in Proposition 1, is connected. On
the other hand, we denote by C2 conditions 1) and 2) in
Proposition 2. To establish the claim of the statement, it
suffices to show that C1 and C2 are equivalent. First, suppose
C1 holds for D. Suppose D is not a dominating set of
(V,E). Then, there exists v ∈ V such that neither v nor
any of its neighbors is in D. By the definition of ID(E) in
Proposition 1, the vertex v is isolated in (V, ID(E)). This is
a contradiction of C1, and hence D satisfying C1 must be
a dominating set of (V,E). Further, since by C1 (V, ID(E))
is connected, for every i, j ∈ D there is a path in (V, ID(E))
between i and j. Since every edge in the path is incident
to at least one vertex in D (according to the definition
of ID(E)), the sequence of vertices traversed by the path
satisfy part 2) of condition C2. Therefore, C1 implies C2.
Conversely, suppose D does not satisfy C1 (i.e., (V, ID(E))
is not connected). Assume further that D is a dominating set
of (V,E) (otherwise part 1) of C2 fails to hold). Let (V0,E0)
be a connected component of (V, ID(E)) such that V0∩D 6= /0
and let i denote a vertex in V0∩D. Since (V, ID(E)) is not
connected, V \V0 6= /0. In addition, D∩ (V \V0) 6= /0 since
otherwise D is not dominating. Hence, there exists some
j ∈ D∩ (V \V0). Let E˜ = {{u,v} ∈ E | u ∈ V0,v ∈ V \V0}.
Then, any path between i and j must traverse an edge in
E˜ . Let {s, t} ∈ E˜ be a traversed edge, then, according to the
analysis in the proof of Proposition 1, s /∈D and t /∈D. As a
result, any sequence i = i0, i1, . . . , ip = j with {ik, ik+1} ∈ E
for 0 ≤ k ≤ (p− 1) fails to satisfy part 2) of C2. Hence, if
C1 does not hold for D, either part 1) or part 2) of C2 must
fail to hold. Consequently, C2 implies C1, and hence C1 and
C2 are equivalent.
In Fig. 1 both shaded node sets are dominating. In the left,
between every two nodes in the shaded set D = {2,3,4,5}
there is a path traversing nodes only in D, satisfying condi-
tion 2) in Proposition 2. In the right, the sequence 1,2,4,6
“links together” all three nodes in the shaded set D =
{1,2,6}. The sequence satisfies condition 2) in Proposition 2,
since between 2 and 6 there is only one node (i.e., 4) that is
not in D.
Remark 2: A connected dominating set Dc (e.g., [17]) is
a dominating set with an additional property that between
any two nodes in Dc there exists a path traversing nodes
only in Dc (e.g., left example in Fig. 1). Condition 2) in
Proposition 2 is a relaxed notion of connectedness. For D
satisfying condition 2), between any two nodes in D there
exists a “relaxed path” such that between two consecutive
members of D along the path there can be one node not in D
(e.g., the path 1,2,4,6 in the right of Fig. 1). This motivates
the term “relaxed connected dominating set” (RCDS), for
any D ∈ V satisfying conditions 1) and 2) in Proposition 2.

Remark 3: By Remark 2 a connected dominating set is
a RCDS, which is a dominating set according to condition
1) in Proposition 2. Hence, for a given graph it holds
that domination number ≤ “relaxed connected domination
number” ≤ connected domination number. See Fig. 2 for an
example. 
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Fig. 2: In this example graph, a minimum connected dom-
inating set can be {1,2,3,4}. A minimum RCDS can be
{1,2,4}, while a minimum dominating set can be {1,4}.
Proposition 2 states that the perfect protection problem
can be described as the RCDS problem seeking a minimum
cardinality RCDS. In the sequel, we use the term RCDS
problem exclusively to emphasize the graph nature of the
problem and its connection to the connected dominating set
problem. A proof similar to the one in [18] can establish that
the RCDS problem is NP-hard even for planar graphs. This
proof is obtained by reducing the RCDS problem from the
planar vertex cover problem.
Proposition 3: The RCDS problem is NP-hard, even if the
problem is restricted to instances with planar graphs.
Proof: The proof is shown by a reduction from the
planar vertex cover problem whose proof of NP-hardness
can be found in, for example, [19]. Let G = (V,E) be a
planar graph with an arbitrary given embedding, defining an
instance of the planar vertex cover problem. We use symbol
G both for the planar graph and the plane graph given by
the embedding. We assume that G is connected since the
minimum vertex cover of a graph is the union of minimum
vertex covers of the connected components. We construct an
auxiliary bipartite graph G′ = (V ′,U ′,E ′) as follows:
• Vertex set V ′ =V ∪F ′, where F ′ and the set of all faces
of G are one-to-one correspondent.
• Vertex set U ′ = A∪F . The sets A and E are one-to-one
correspondent. The set F and the set of all faces of G
are one-to-one correspondent.
• Edge set E ′ = E ′ve ∪E
′
v f ∪E
′
f . For each e = {u,v} ∈ E ,
there are two edges {u,e} and {e,v} in E ′ve. For each
f ∈ F , there is an edge {v, f} ∈ E ′v f with v ∈ V if and
only if v is incident to the face (of G) corresponding to
f . For each face f of G, there is an edge { f , f ′} ∈ E ′f ,
with f , f ′ corresponding to the same face.
By construction, G′ is a connected planar graph. The reduc-
tion proof consists of two steps. First, we show that for any
VC ⊆V being a vertex cover of G, the subgraph of G
′ induced
by VC ∪ F is connected. It suffices to show that between
any two vertices f ,g ∈ F there is a path traversing vertices
entirely in VC∪F , because all vertices in V has at least one
neighbor in F . We consider the dual graph G∗ of G. The
relevant properties of G∗ are as follows (e.g., [20]):
• each vertex in G∗ corresponds to a face of G (i.e., a
member of F in G′),
• each edge connecting two vertices in G∗ corresponds
to an edge (i.e., a member of A in G′) shared by the
boundaries of the two faces in G,
• G∗ is connected if and only if G is connected.
As a result, for f ,g ∈ F (in G′), there exists a sequence
( f =) f1,e1, f2,e2, . . . ,ep−1, fp(= g) for fk ∈F and ek ∈A that
corresponds to a path connecting f and g in G∗. Since VC is a
vertex cover of G, each ek is covered by (at least) one vertex
in VC denoted by vek ∈VC. Consequently, the sequence ( f =
) f1,ve1 , f2,ve2 , . . . ,vep−1 , fp(= g) is a walk in G
′ traversing
vertices entirely in VC ∪F . This establishes the claim of the
first step (of the reduction proof).
For the second step, we show that from every minimum
RCDS of G′ (minimum RCDS exists because G′ is con-
nected) it is possible to construct a minimum vertex cover
of G. To begin, note that any RCDS must include at least
one of f ∈ F and f ′ ∈ F ′ associated with each face of
G because the vertices in F ′ must be dominated. Since it
is always more advantageous to contain f than to contain
f ′, from every minimum RCDS it is always possible to
construct a (possibly different) minimum RCDS that includes
F but not F ′. We refer to this as claim (a). In turn, the
inclusion of F means that the vertices in V are dominated.
To dominate the vertices in A, it is possible that vertices in
A are chosen in a RCDS. However, let D denote a RCDS
such that F ⊂ D and A∩D 6= /0, we can construct another
RCDS, denoted D′, such that A∩D′ = /0 and D′ satisfies
conditions 1) and 2) in Proposition 2 (to be shown shortly).
We construct D′ by replacing each {u,v} ∈ A∩D with either
u ∈V or v ∈V . By construction D′ satisfies condition 1) in
Proposition 2. If {u,v}∈D and the subsequence u,{u,v},v is
on some “relaxed path” whose two ends are vertices not in
A (this is to establish condition 2) in Proposition 2), then
the subsequence u,{u,v},v can be replaced with u, fuv,v,
where fuv corresponds to a face with which both u and v
are incident. The new subsequence is valid for the relaxed
(connected) path because F ⊂D′ (as F ⊂D). As a result, D′
is also a RCDS and |D′| ≤ |D| (inequality is strict for example
when u ∈ D and it replaces {u,v} ∈ A∩D). We refer to this
as claim (b). As a consequence of claims (a) and (b), it is
without loss of generality to search for a minimum RCDS for
G′ with candidates of the form U ∪F , where U ⊆V . Though
U ∪F need not be a RCDS for some U ∈V . However, more
specialization on U can be inferred. By definition of RCDS,
all vertices in A need to be dominated. Because vertices of
F are not neighbors of vertices in A. The vertices of A must
be dominated by the vertices in U ⊆ V , meaning that U
must be a vertex cover of G. Therefore, if a RCDS is of
the form U ∪F with U ⊆ V then U = VC for some vertex
cover of G. This is referred to as claim (c). In addition, as
shown in the first step of the reduction proof, VC being a
vertex cover of G implies that the subgraph (of G′) induced
by VC ∪F is connected. This connectedness fact, combined
with claims (a), (b) and (c), leads to the conclusion that the
RCDS problem is equivalent to a restricted version in which
all solution candidates have the form VC ∪F for VC being
a vertex cover of G. Consequently, the minimum objective
value of the RCDS problem on G′ is |V ⋆C |+ |F |, where |V
⋆
C |
is the cardinality of a minimum vertex cover of G. This
value of the optimal objective value, together with claims
(a), (b) and (c), implies that from any optimal solution to
the RCDS problem on planar graph G′ we can construct a
minimum vertex cover for planar graph G. This concludes
the reduction proof.
IV. BRANCHWIDTH AND SPHERE-CUT DECOMPOSITION
If the given graph G=(V,E) is planar, the RCDS problem
can be solved in time linear with problem instance size (i.e.,
|E|) when a graph structure parameter called branchwidth (to
be defined shortly) is fixed. The proposed approach, which
resembles but generalizes the ones in [14], [15], consists
of two steps. Firstly, an optimal sphere-cut decomposition
(to be defined) of G is computed. Secondly, a dynamic
programming algorithm, based on the computed sphere-cut
decomposition, solves the RCDS problem.
Given a graph (V,E), a branch decomposition [10] is
a pair (T,τ) where T is a unrooted binary tree with |E|
leaf nodes, and τ is a bijection from the set of leaf nodes
of T to E . Every non-leaf node of T has degree three.
For any e ∈ E(T ), the subgraph (V (T ),E(T ) \ {e}) has
two connected components denoted T1(e) and T2(e). Let L1
and L2 denote the leaf nodes of T1(e) and T2(e), respec-
tively. Then, we denote E1(e) := τ(L1) ⊆ E and E2(e) :=
τ(L2) ⊆ E . We define G1(e), G2(e) to be the subgraphs
of G induced by E1(e) and E2(e) respectively. That is,
G1(e) = (∪ f∈E1(e) f ,E1(e)) and G2(e) = (∪ f∈E2(e) f ,E2(e)).
For e ∈ E(T ), we define the middle set, denoted ω(e),
to be V (G1(e))∩V (G2(e)). In other words, ω(e) := {v ∈
V v ∈ e1,v ∈ e2, for some e1 ∈ E1(e) and e2 ∈ E2(e)}. The
width of branch decomposition (T,τ) is maxe∈E(T ) |ω(e)|.
The branchwidth of (V,E) is the minimum width over all
branch decompositions of (V,E). A branch decomposition
of (V,E) is optimal if its width is the branchwidth of the
graph. For planar graphs, a sphere-cut decomposition is a
branch decomposition with an additional property: for each
e ∈ E(T ), it is possible to draw a closed curve separating
the subgraphs G1(e) and G2(e) in an arbitrary planar em-
bedding of G, such that the curve crosses G only at ω(e).
Traversing the curve (clockwise or counterclockwise) leads
to a cyclic order denoted by pie. For a planar graph (V,E),
an optimal sphere-cut decomposition can be computed in
O(log2(|V |)(|V |+ |E|)
2) time (e.g., [21]), as the optimal
branch decomposition computed using [21] is also an optimal
sphere-cut decomposition.
V. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING FOR PLANAR RCDS PROBLEM
A. Notations
T ′: Let (T,τ) be an optimal sphere-cut decomposition of
graph G = (V,E). Construct T ′, a rooted tree from T
by inserting two new nodes: (a) node z into any edge
{u,v} ∈ E(T ), and (b) node r (the root node) forming
an edge {z,r}. Specifically, let {u,v} ∈ E(T ), then T ′=(
V (T )∪{z,r},(E(T )\ {u,v})∪{{u,z},{z,v},{z,r}}
)
.
Ge: For each e ∈ E(T
′), a leaf node u ∈V (T ′) is a descen-
dant of e if the (unique) path from root r to u traverses
e. Let VT ′(e) denote the subset of leaf nodes of T
′ that
are descendants of e. Then, Ge is the subgraph of G
induced by τ(VT ′(e)). Ge is either G1(e) or G2(e) in
the discussion on branch decomposition in Section IV.
ω ′: Recall the definition of middle set ω(e) ⊆ V for
e ∈ E(T ) in Section IV. We define a function ω ′ :
E(T ′) 7→ 2V as follows: let ω ′({z,r}) = /0, ω ′({u,z}) =
ω ′({z,v}) = ω({u,v}) and ω ′(e) = ω(e) for all e ∈
E(T ′) \ {{u,z},{z,v},{z,r}}. ω ′(e) is also called the
middle set, bordering complement graph of Ge.
e1, e2: For each edge e ∈ E(T
′) not incident to a leaf node
in T ′, let ve ∈V (T
′) denote the node incident to e and
having e on the path from the root r to ve. There are
two other edges incident to ve. Let e1 and e2 denote
these two edges. They are the two children of e.
For the example graph G in Fig. 1, the rooted sphere-cut
decomposition tree T ′ is illustrated in Fig. 3. For e3,e5 ∈
E(T ′) in Fig. 3, the corresponding subgraphs Ge3 ⊆ G and
Ge5 ⊆ G are shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 3: The rooted sphere-cut decomposition tree T ′ of the
example graph G in Fig. 1. Each leaf node of T ′ corresponds
to an edge of G.
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Fig. 4: Subgraphs Ge3 (left) and Ge5 (right) of the graph in
Fig. 1, for e3,e5 ∈ E(T ′) in Fig. 3. In both subgraphs, the
shaded nodes form the middle sets ω ′(e3) and ω ′(e5).
B. Dynamic programming procedure
For each e ∈ E(T ′), we color the nodes in ω ′(e) in three
possible basic colors: 0, 0ˆ, 1. A vector ce ∈ {0, 0ˆ,1}
|ω ′(e)| is
called a basic coloring (of ω ′(e)). In addition, basic color
0 can be associated with four detailed colors: 0[, 0], 0∗, 0s.
Similarly, basic color 1 can be associated with the detailed
colors: 1[, 1], 1∗, 1s. There is no detailed color associated
with basic color 0ˆ. Denote C := {0[,0],0∗,0s, 0ˆ,1[,1],1∗,1s}.
A vector c¯e ∈C
|ω ′(e)|
is called a detailed coloring (of ω ′(e)).
The detailed colorings c¯e for e∈ E(T
′), supplemented by the
basic colorings ce, define the dynamic programming states
which parameterize the partial problems denoted by Pe(c¯e).
A partial problem Pe(c¯e) seeks a minimum cardinality set
D ⊆ V (Ge) satisfying the “domination constraint” (details
in Appendix A) and the “relaxed connectedness constraint”
(details in Appendix C). It can be verified (details omitted)
that the solution to Pe(·) can be assembled from those of
Pe1(·) and Pe2(·) with e1 and e2 being the two children of e. In
addition, P{z,r}(·) is the original RCDS problem. We denote
Ae(c¯e) as the optimal objective value of partial problem
Pe(c¯e), with Ae(c¯e) = ∞ if and only if Pe(c¯e) is infeasible.
Ae(·) is the value function in dynamic programming. For
e ∈ E(T ′) incident to a leaf node in T ′, the partial problem
Pe(·) involves only one edge and two nodes – it can be solved
by enumeration. Accordingly, for these “leaf edges” of T ′
the value function Ae(·) can be defined with the following
rule depending on whether |ω ′(e)| = 1 or |ω ′(e)| = 2 (no
other case is possible). For |ω ′(e)|= 1, except for Ae(0s) = 1
and Ae(1s) = 1, all other values of Ae(·) are set to ∞.
For |ω ′(e)| = 2, except for Ae(0[,1]) = 1, Ae(0ˆ, 0ˆ) = 0,
Ae(1[,0]) = 1 and Ae(1[,1]) = 2, all other values of Ae(·)
are set to ∞. For each edge in E(T ′) not incident to the
leaf nodes of T ′, Ae(·) is calculated through the following
dynamic programming recursion:
Algorithm 1 (Dynamic programming recursion):
for all basic colorings ce ∈ {0, 0ˆ,1}
|ω ′(e)|
do
for all detailed colorings c¯e ∈ C
|ω ′(e)|
associated with
ce do
initialize Ae(c¯e) = ∞
end for
for all basic colorings (ce1 ,ce2) consistent with ce do
for all detailed colorings (c¯e1 , c¯e2) associated with
(ce1 ,ce2) do
if c¯e1 and c¯e2 are compatible, leading to some c¯e ∈
C
|ω ′(e)|
then
If profitable, update Ae(c¯e) and set (c¯e1 , c¯e2) as
the pair
(
c¯⋆e1(c¯e), c¯
⋆
e2
(c¯e)
)
minimizing Ae(c¯e)
end if
end for
end for
end for
Certain details of Algorithm 1 require more explanations.
Appendix A discusses when basic colorings (ce1 ,ce2) are
consistent with ce. In addition, Appendix C provides the
details about when c¯e1 and c¯e2 are compatible, which c¯e is
resulted and how Ae(c¯e) is updated. For edge {z,r} (i.e., the
last iteration), ω ′({z,r}) = /0 and hence Algorithm 1 should
be interpreted accordingly. In this case, the value function
A{z,r} is in fact a constant, obtained by the minimization
in (3) in Appendix D. The details of the last iteration are
explained in Appendices B and D.
Let D⋆ denote the minimum RCDS to be returned. Then
the members of D⋆ can be decided by a tree traversal starting
from the root: let er1 and er2 denote the two children edges
of {z,r}. Let c¯∗er1
, c¯∗er2
be a minimizing pair leading to the
value of A{z,r} as returned by Algorithm 1. Subsequently, for
each e ∈ E(T ′) such that c¯∗e is known, we handle two cases:
• If e is incident to a leaf node of T ′ then for each u ∈
ω ′(e), c¯∗e(u) ∈ {1[,1],1∗,1s} implies u ∈D
⋆ and u /∈D⋆
otherwise. If |ω ′(e)| = 1 and suppose u ∈ ω ′(e) and
v /∈ ω ′(e), then v ∈ D⋆ if and only if u /∈ D⋆.
• If e is not incident to a leaf node, then the optimal
detailed colorings c¯∗e1 and c¯
∗
e2
for the two children edges
e1 and e2 are set as c¯
⋆
e1
(c¯∗e) and c¯
⋆
e2
(c¯∗e).
The process continues until all edges in T ′ have been visited.
For the example graph in Fig. 1 and the corresponding
rooted sphere-cut decomposition tree T ′ in Fig. 3, Ae(·) are
first determined, in any order, for edges e incident to leaf
nodes (i.e., in the bottom). Then, Ae(·) are determined for
edges e = e1, . . . , e7, {z,r} one after another. Once Ae(·) is
determined for all e ∈ E(T ′), the optimal detailed colorings
c¯∗e are determined for edges e = e
7, . . . , e1 one after another.
Then the optimal detailed colorings corresponding to the
leaf-incident edges are determined and an optimal RCDS
D⋆ is found.
C. Fixed parameter tractability
The computation effort of the entire dynamic program-
ming procedure for planar RCDS problem is dominated
by the dynamic programming recursion from leaves of T ′
to root (i.e., Algorithm 1 in Section V-B). In the inner-
most for-loop, the computation cost is dominated by the
checking of whether c¯e1 and c¯e2 are compatible, which
amounts to computing connected components of the bipartite
graph detailed in Appendix C. This cost is O((|ω ′(e1)|+
|(ω ′(e2)|)
2) = O(BW2) time (e.g., [22]), where BW is the
branchwidth of graph G. From each basic coloring cex (x
being a wildcard for 1 or 2), at most 4|ω
′(ex)| detailed
colorings can be derived (e.g., cex = (1,1, . . . ,1) leads to
4|ω
′(ex)| detailed colorings). Therefore, the innermost for-
loop is executed at most 4|ω
′(e1)|+|ω
′(e2)| = O(42BW) times,
for each specific pair of basic colorings (ce1 ,ce2). In total,
there are no more than 3(|ω
′(e)|+|ω ′(e1)|+|ω
′(e2)|) = O(33BW)
pairs of basic colorings (ce1 ,ce2) considered in Algorithm 1.
Therefore, Algorithm 1 requires O(BW233BW42BW ) time for
each run. Since Algorithm 1 is run for each e ∈ E(T ′)
between the root and leaves of T ′ and |E(T ′)|= O(|E|), the
total computation cost for dynamic programming recursion is
O(BW233BW42BW |E|). This is typical complexity result of a
sphere-cut decomposition based algorithm. Computation cost
grows very moderately with problem instance size, provided
that branchwidth is small. The numerical study in Section VI
indicates that small branchwidth is common in practice.
VI. NUMERICAL CASE STUDY
Graphs from the IEEE power system benchmarks are con-
sidered. The minimum RCDS of these graphs are computed
by solving integer program (1). To evaluate the proposed
sphere-cut decomposition/dynamic programming based solu-
tion approach (SCD approach for short) for planar graphs, we
“planarize” the benchmark graphs using the algorithm in [13]
if necessary. Then we compute the corresponding minimum
RCDS using the SCD approach. The cardinality of the
minimum RCDS on the planarized graph is an upper bound
of the cardinality of the minimum RCDS on the original
graph, because removing edges makes it more difficult both
to satisfy condition 1) and condition 2) in Proposition 2.
As a comparison, the minimum dominating sets of the
benchmarks are computed to illustrate the difference between
the RCDS problem and the dominating set problem. The
computation results are listed in Table I. In the fifth column,
the symbol BWp denotes the branchwidth of the planarized
benchmark graph. In the sixth column, the symbol |D⋆SCD| de-
notes the cardinality of the minimum RCDS of the planarized
benchmark, as returned by the SCD method. This number
is greater than or equal to the cardinality of the minimum
RCDS of the original graph, which is denoted by |D⋆| in
the seventh column. In the last column, the symbol |DS|
denotes the regular domination number. It is smaller than
or equal to |D⋆|, because a RCDS is a dominating set with
an additional property (cf. Proposition 2). Table I verifies the
fact that when a graph is planar, the SCD approach computes
the exact minimum RCDS. In cases where planarization is
necessary, the SCD approach computes only a suboptimal
solution.
TABLE I: branchwidth and RCDS cardinality
Name |V | |E| planar BWp |D
⋆
SCD| |D
⋆| |DS|
IEEE 9 9 9 yes 2 3 3 3
IEEE 14 14 20 yes 2 4 4 4
IEEE 24 24 34 no 3 8 8 7
IEEE 30 30 41 yes 3 10 10 10
IEEE 39 39 46 yes 3 15 15 13
IEEE 57 57 78 no 4 20 19 17
IEEE 118 118 179 yes 4 34 34 32
IEEE 300 300 409 no 4 97 93 87
To compute the minimum RCDS, problem (1) is solved
using IBM CPLEX. To compute the minimum dominating
set, an integer program from [13] is solved using IBM
CPLEX. To compute the branchwidth and sphere-cut de-
composition, we utilize the state-of-the-art implementation
by Prof. Gu’s group [23]. The dynamic programming com-
putations, as described in Section V-B, are implemented in
MATLAB (for ease of implementation). The computations
for branchwidth and branch decomposition are performed
on a Linux machine with a 3 GHz CPU and 4GB of
RAM. All other computations are performed on a Mac
machine with a 2.5 GHz CPU and 8GB of RAM. The
computation times for solving the RCDS problem using
the SCD approach and integer programming (CPLEX) are
shown in Table II. In the table, the column labeled TSCD
represents the time to compute the sphere-cut decomposition
(with the code from Gu’s group). The column labeled TDP
represents the time to run dynamic programming as described
in Section V-B. The column labeled TIP represents the time
to run CPLEX. From the table, it can be seen that the
TABLE II: computation time (sec)
Name |V | |E| BWp TSCD TDP TIP
IEEE 9 9 9 2 0.03 0.1498 0.0047
IEEE 14 14 20 2 0.05 0.3487 0.0064
IEEE 24 24 34 3 0.13 1.2433 0.0546
IEEE 30 30 41 3 0.06 1.3262 0.0096
IEEE 39 39 46 3 0.09 1.6348 0.0127
IEEE 57 57 78 4 0.12 21.4133 0.3217
IEEE 118 118 179 4 1 19.4139 0.1287
IEEE 300 300 409 4 3.4 45.3790 0.6553
computation effort of the SCD approach (computing sphere-
cut decomposition and dynamic programming) is affected
significantly by the branchwidth of the graph, while the effort
grows roughly linearly with the problem instance size (i.e.,
|E|). This is consistent with the computation time analyses
in [23] and in Section V-C. However, while the MATLAB
implementation of the dynamic programming has acceptable
efficiency (within a minute for all test instances), it is far
from efficient in contrast with the sphere-cut decomposition
implementation and CPLEX. For dynamic programming, a
more advanced implementation using a more appropriate
language (e.g., C instead of MATLAB) is highly desirable.
CPLEX runtime remains reasonable for all the test instances.
In a future study, even larger instances should be tested to
determine the limitation of integer programming approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper is the second installment (the first being [13])
of the author’s effort to introduce the machinery of graph
decomposition (in particular, branch decomposition) to sys-
tematically exploit the inherent structure of power networks
in practice, in order to develop solution strategies to solve
hard combinatorial optimization problems relevant to appli-
cations. These two papers demonstrate the flexibility of graph
decomposition/dynamic programming as a methodology to
derive customized algorithms for application problems. The
computation cost of the proposed methodology grows only
linearly with problem instance size, provided that the branch-
width is fixed and small. This is drastically different from
the scalability property of the integer programming approach.
While the computation studies still indicate considerably
better efficiency performance for CPLEX, the graph decom-
position approach (with the author’s amateur implementa-
tion) performs reasonably well in practice. The prospect of
better scalability of the graph decomposition approach calls
for algorithmic developments and implementations in more
professional manners in order to truly demonstrate the power
of the approach. Further, more theoretical development is
desirable. For instance, removing the planarity assumption
can dramatically broaden the scope of applications.
APPENDIX
A. Consistency of basic colorings, general case
For e ∈ E(T ′) and c¯e ∈ C
|ω ′(e)|
, the associated basic col-
oring ce defines a domination constraint for partial problem
Pe(c¯e). In particular, any solution candidate D ⊆ V (Ge) for
Pe(c¯e) must satisfy the “domination constraint” that for each
u ∈ ω ′(e)
• ce(u) = 0 =⇒ u /∈ D but it is a neighbor of a member
of D;
• ce(u) = 0ˆ =⇒ u /∈ D and it is not neighboring any
member of D;
• ce(u) = 1 =⇒ u ∈ D.
For e ∈ E(T ′) and its children edges e1 and e2, the middle
sets ω ′(e), ω ′(e1) and ω
′(e2) are related. The following
definitions are needed to describe the relationship:
X1 := ω
′(e)\ω ′(e2),
X2 := ω
′(e)\ω ′(e1),
X3 := ω
′(e)∩ω ′(e1)∩ω
′(e2),
X4 := (ω
′(e1)∪ω
′(e2))\ω
′(e).
See Fig. 5 for an illustration of the sets defined above.
Because of the overlapping of ω ′(e), ω ′(e1), ω
′(e2) and the
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Fig. 5: In this example, Ge is the graph induced by node set
{1,2,3,4,5}. Ge1 is induced by {1,2,3,4}. Ge2 is induced by
{1,2,3,5}. The middle sets are ω ′(e) = {1,4,3,5}, ω ′(e1) =
{1,2,3,4}, ω ′(e2) = {1,2,3,5}. X1 = {4}, X2 = {5}, X3 =
{1,3}, X4 = {2}. The node in X4 is in the middle sets of Ge1
and Ge2 , but it becomes an “internal” node in Ge.
fact that V (Ge) =V (Ge1)∪V (Ge2), the three basic colorings
ce, ce1 and ce2 are not always consistent. For a given ce,
the pair (ce1 ,ce2) are consistent with ce if there exist RCDS
candidates D1 ⊆V (Ge1) and D2 ⊆V (Ge2) such that
• D1 satisfies the domination constraints in ω
′(e1) char-
acterized by ce1 ;
• D2 satisfies the domination constraints in ω
′(e2) char-
acterized by ce2 ;
• For all u ∈ X3∪X4, either (a): both u ∈ D1 and u ∈ D2
or (b): both u /∈ D1 and u /∈ D2;
• De := D1∪D2 (with De ⊆V (Ge)) satisfies the domina-
tion constraints in ω ′(e) characterized by ce.
Consistency can be characterized directly through the basic
colorings ce, ce1 and ce2 :
• For u ∈ X1, ce(u) = ce1(u).
• For u ∈ X2, ce(u) = ce2(u).
• For u∈X3, if ce(u)∈{0ˆ,1} then ce(u)= ce1(u)= ce2(u).
If ce(u) = 0 then one of the following three holds: (a)
ce1(u) = 0,ce2(u) = 0ˆ or (b) ce1(u) = 0ˆ,ce2(u) = 0, or
(c) ce1(u) = ce2(u) = 0.
• For u ∈ X4, exactly one of the four cases must hold:
(a) ce1(u) = ce2(u) = 1, (b) ce1(u) = 0,ce2(u) = 0ˆ, (c)
ce1(u) = 0ˆ,ce2(u) = 0 or (d) ce1(u) = ce2(u) = 0.
B. Consistency of basic colorings, last iteration
For the last iteration of Algorithm 1 concerning the edge
{z,r}, ω ′({z,r}) = /0. Hence, ce is in principle not defined.
Accordingly, the first two “for-loops” in Algorithm 1 are
ignored. Further, the third “for-loop” should be understood as
ce1 and ce2 being consistent with each other. The consistency
in this special case means that for u ∈ X4 = ω
′(e1)∪ω
′(e2)
exactly one of the four cases must hold: (a) ce1(u) = ce2(u)=
1, (b) ce1(u) = 0,ce2(u) = 0ˆ, (c) ce1(u) = 0ˆ,ce2(u) = 0 or
(d) ce1(u) = ce2(u) = 0. This is a simplified version of the
characterization in Appendix A because only X4 is nonempty.
C. Compatibility of detailed colorings and update of Ae(·)
Recall from Proposition 1 that D ⊆ V (Ge) defines a sub-
graph (D, ID(E(Ge)). For e∈ E(T
′), a detailed coloring c¯e ∈
C
|ω ′(e)|
defines a “relaxed connectedness constraint” for
partial problem Pe(c¯e). In particular, every solution candidate
D⊆V (Ge) for Pe(c¯e) must satisfy (with x being a wildcard
for 0 or 1), for all u ∈ ω ′(e)
• c¯e(u) = x[ =⇒ ce(u) = x. In addition, according to the
cyclic order pie, u is the first node in the intersection
between ω ′(e) and the node set of a connected com-
ponent of (D, ID(E(Ge))). In addition, the intersection
contains at least two nodes;
• c¯e(u) = x] is similar to the case c¯e(u) = x[, except that
u is the last node in the corresponding intersection;
• c¯e(u) = x∗ is similar to the case c¯e(u) = x[, except that u
is neither the first nor the last node in the corresponding
intersection;
• c¯e(u) = xs is similar to the case c¯e(u) = x[, except that
the corresponding intersection contains only one node,
namely u.
Further, for c¯e(u) = 0ˆ the domination constraint imposed by
basic color 0ˆ must be satisfied by D. In this case, the node
u colored 0ˆ is not part of any connected components. It
can be verified that, because of planarity, a detailed coloring
c¯e ∈ C
|ω ′(e)|
specifies completely the information regarding
the number of connected components of (D, ID(E(Ge)))
that contain at least one node in ω ′(e), as well as the
information regarding the nodes in ω ′(e) that each connected
component contains. For e ∈ E(T ′) and e1, e2 being the
children edges, let c¯e1 and c¯e2 be two detailed colorings such
that the associated basic colorings ce1 and ce2 are consistent
with some ce ∈ {0, 0ˆ,1}
|ω ′(e)|. Then, the pair (c¯e1 , c¯e2) are
compatible if there exist RCDS candidates D1 ⊆V (Ge1) and
D2 ⊆V (Ge2) such that
• D1 satisfies the “relaxed connectedness” constraints
characterized by c¯e1 ;
• D2 satisfies the “relaxed connectedness” constraints
characterized by c¯e2 ;
• For De := D1 ∪ D2, every connected component of
(De, IDe(E(Ge))) intersecting X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3 ∪ X4 must
intersect X1∪X2∪X3 = ω
′(e).
Note that, with an inductive argument, it can be shown
that the third bullet above implies that every connected
component of (De, IDe(E(Ge))) intersects X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3 =
ω ′(e). The following calculations can check whether or not
the third bullet above is satisfied: c¯e1 specifies the number
of connected components of (D1, ID1(E(Ge1))) intersecting
ω ′(e1). Let C
1
e1
, . . . , C
p
e1 denote these connected components.
The vector c¯e1 also specifies the nodes in ω
′(e1) that are
contained in each Cke1 for k = 1, . . . , p. Similarly, c¯e2 specifies
the analogous information with the corresponding connected
components denoted by C1e2 , . . . , C
q
e2 . Construct a bipartite
graph with node set U1 ∪U2. U1 = {u1, . . . ,up} and U2 =
{v1, . . . ,vq}. For 1≤ s≤ p, 1≤ t ≤ q, there is an edge {us,vt}
in the bipartite graph if and only if Cse1 and C
t
e2
share at
least one node in X3∪X4. Then, the connected components
of the bipartite graph correspond to the connected compo-
nents of (De, IDe(E(Ge))) that intersect X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3 ∪ X4.
In addition, for each of these connected components (of
(De, IDe(E(Ge)))) its intersection with X1∪X2∪X3∪X4 can
be inferred from the bipartite graph. Thus, the condition in
the third bullet can be checked.
If the pair of detailed colorings (c¯e1 , c¯e2) are compatible,
there exists a unique detailed coloring c¯e ∈ C
|ω ′(e)|
such that
all De generated by the “compatibility check” above (i.e.,
the three bullets), together with the connected components
of its corresponding (De, IDe(E(Ge))), satisfy the “relaxed
connectedness” constraint defined by c¯e. We call c¯e1 and
c¯e2 lead to c¯e. In this case, the optimal solutions of partial
problems Pe1(c¯e1) and Pe2(c¯e2) can be combined to form a
feasible solution of partial problem Pe(c¯e). This may lead to
an update of the “currently best” feasible solution of Pe(c¯e).
Correspondingly, the value function is updated as follows:
Ae(c¯e) ← min
{
Ae(c¯e), Ae1(c¯e1)+Ae2(c¯e2)− #1(X3, c¯e1)
−#1(X4, c¯e1)
}
,
(2)
where #1(X3, c¯e1) denotes the number of nodes in X3 with
basic color 1 by coloring c¯e1 (note that #1(X3, c¯e1) =
#1(X3, c¯e2)). Similarly, #1(X4, c¯e1) denotes the number of
nodes in X4 with basic color 1 by coloring c¯e1 (and also
by c¯e2). By definition of ω
′, there is no node in exactly one
of ω ′(e), ω ′(e1) and ω
′(e2). Hence, X3 and X4, which are
disjoint, partition the set ω ′(e1)∩ω
′(e2) =V (Ge1)∩V (Ge2)
(cf. Fig. 5). Therefore, in (2) the two negative terms prevent
double-counting of RCDS members in ω ′(e1)∩ω
′(e2). For
the case where c¯e1 and c¯e2 lead to an update of Ae(c¯e), the
minimizing pair is updated as c¯⋆e1(c¯e) = c¯e1 and c¯
⋆
e2
(c¯e) = c¯e2 .
D. Compatibility of detailed colorings, last iteration
For the last iteration of Algorithm 1 concerning the edge
{z,r}, ω ′({z,r}) = /0. Hence, no detailed coloring c¯{z,r}
is defined. Accordingly, the “if-statement” in Algorithm 1
should be interpreted as c¯e1 and c¯e2 being compatible. This
means that there exist RCDS candidates D1 ⊆ V (Ge1) and
D2 ⊆V (Ge2) such that
• D1 satisfies the “relaxed connectedness” constraints
characterized by c¯e1 , as described in Appendix C;
• D2 satisfies the “relaxed connectedness” constraints
characterized by c¯e2 , as described in Appendix C;
• For D := D1 ∪D2, the subgraph (D, ID(E(G))) is con-
nected.
This is a simplified and modified version of the characteri-
zation in Appendix C. Since X3 = /0, the corresponding value
function update is
A{z,r}←min
{
A{z,r}, Ae1(c¯e1)+Ae2(c¯e2)− #1(X4, c¯e1)
}
.
(3)
Notice that #1(X4, c¯e1) = #1(X4, c¯e2) because of the consis-
tency of ce1 and ce2 .
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